

Peter Morris

# Introduction to Game Theory

With 44 Illustrations



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Peter Morris  
Mathematics Department  
Penn State University  
University Park, PA 16802  
USA

*Editorial Board*  
(North America):

S. Axler  
Mathematics Department  
San Francisco State University  
San Francisco, CA 94132  
USA

F.W. Gehring  
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Mathematics Department  
University of California at Berkeley  
Berkeley, CA 94720-3840  
USA

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