DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS

Series Editor KENNETH H. ROSEN

Introducing Game Theory and Its Applications

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CHAPMAN & HALL/CRC

A CRC Press Company

Boca Raton London New York Washington, D.C.

Contents

Introduction **1**

Chapter 1 Combinatorial games **9**
1.1 Definition of combinatorial game 9
1.2 The fundamental theorem for combinatorial games 15
1.3 Nim 20
1.4 Hex and other games 27
1.5 Tree games 36
1.6 Grundy functions 38
1.7 Bogus Nim-sums 42

Chapter 2 Two-person zero-sum games **53**
2.1 Games in normal form 53
2.2 Saddle points and equilibrium pairs 56
2.3 Maximin and minimax 60
2.4 Mixed strategies 66
2.5 2×2 matrix games 80
2.6 $2 \times n$, $m \times 2$, and 3×3 matrix games 86
2.7 Linear programming 97

Chapter 3 The simplex method. The fundamental theorem of duality. Solution of two-person zero-sum games **109**
3.1 Slack variables. Perfect canonical linear programming problems 109
3.2 The simplex method 113
3.3 Pivoting 117
3.4 The perfect phase of the simplex method 118
3.5 The Big M method 122
3.6 Bland's rules to prevent cycling 126
3.7 Duality and the simplex method 131
3.8 Solution of game matrices 135

Chapter 4 Non-zero-sum games and k-person games **143**
4.1 The general setting 143
4.2 Nash equilibria 147
4.3 Graphical method for finding Nash equilibria for 2×2 matrices 152
4.4 Inadequacies of Nash equilibria in non-zero sum games 169
4.5 The Nash arbitration procedure 176
4.6 Games with two or more players 184
4.7 Coalitions 188
4.8 Games in coalition form 191
4.9 The Shapley value 194
4.10 Imputations 198
4.11 Strategic equivalence 201
4.12 Stable sets 203

Appendix 1 Finite probability theory **207**

Appendix 2 Utility theory **219**

Appendix 3 Nash's theorem **223**

Answers to selected exercises **227**

Bibliography **247**

Index **255**