The Mathematics of GAMES OF STRATEGY

Theory and Applications

by

Melvin Dresher

Research Mathematician
The Rand Corporation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 GAME, STRATEGY, AND SADDLE-POINT, 1

1. Introduction, 1.
2. Description of a game of strategy, 2.
3. Illustrative examples, 3.
4. Relations among expectations, 10.
5. Saddle-points, 12.
6. Games with perfect information, 14.

2 THE FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM, 16

1. Preliminaries, 16.
2. Games without saddle-points, 17.
3. Mixed strategies, 18.
4. Graphical representation of mixed strategies, 20.
5. The minimax theorem, 21.
6. Optimal mixed strategies, 22.
7. Graphical representation of minimax theorem, 23.
8. Proof of the minimax theorem, 24.

3 PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL STRATEGIES, 36

1. Many optimal strategies, 36.
2. Some properties of an optimal strategy, 36.

3. Convex set of optimal strategies, 39.
4. Operations on games, 39.
5. Dominated strategies, 40.
6. All strategies active, 42.
7. Optimal strategies as extreme points, 43.
8. Extreme point which yields submatrix, 44.
9. Submatrix which yields extreme points, 46.
10. Determining the sets of optimal strategies, 49.
11. Geometry of solutions, 51.
12. Target selection—for attack and defense, 54.
13. Solution of the game "le Her," 59.
14. Solution of the game of "Morra," 60.
15. Reconnaissance as a game of strategy, 61.
16. Application of structure theorems to reconnaissance, 65.
17. Attack on hidden-object, 68.
18. Selecting a particular optimal strategy, 71.

4 GAMES IN EXTENSIVE FORM, 74

1. Representation of games, 74.
2. Games with perfect information—saddle-points, 76.

5 METHODS OF SOLVING GAMES, 79

1. Solving for optimal strategies, 79.
2. Guess and verify, 80.
3. Examination of submatrices, 81.
4. Successive approximations, 82.
5. Graphical solution of 3×3 games, 85.
6. Mapping method for solving games with constraints, 88.
7. Mapping method for solving games, 91.
8. Solution of reconnaissance game by mapping method, 92.

6 GAMES WITH INFINITE NUMBER OF STRATEGIES, 97

1. Introduction, 97.
2. Description of continuous games, 97.
3. Mixed strategy—distribution function, 98.
4. Expectation—Stieltjes integral, 100.

5. Stieltjes integral for continuous function, 101.
6. Stieltjes integral and Riemann integral, 104.
7. Stieltjes integral with respect to a step-function, 104.
8. Some properties of Stieltjes integral, 105.

7 SOLUTION OF INFINITE GAMES, 107

1. Optimal mixed strategy, 107.
2. Existence of optimal strategies, 108.
3. Properties of optimal strategies, 109.
4. Delayed firing, 111.
5. Example of game without solution, 115.

8 GAMES WITH CONVEX PAYOFF FUNCTIONS, 117

1. Convex payoff functions, 117.
2. Optimal pure strategy for Red, 118.
3. Value of game is $\min_y \max_x M(x, y)$, 118.
4. Red's optimal pure strategy, 119.
5. Blue's optimal strategies, 119.
6. Concave payoff functions, 121.
7. General convex payoff, 122.
8. Defense of two targets against attack, 123.
9. Defense of many targets of different values, 124.

9 GAMES OF TIMING—DUELS, 128

1. Duel as a game of timing, 128.
2. Noisy duel: one bullet each duelist, 128.
3. Noisy duel: one bullet each duelist, without saddle-point, 131.
4. Noisy duel: many bullets, equal accuracies, 133.
5. Noisy duel: one bullet, arbitrary accuracies, 134.
6. Silent duel: one bullet each duelist, equal accuracies, 134.
7. Silent-noisy duel: one bullet each duelist, 137.
8. Silent duel: one bullet versus two, equal accuracies, 137.

9. Silent duel: positive initial accuracy, 140.
10. Silent duel: m bullets each duelist, 140.
11. Silent duel: strictly monotonic accuracies, 141.
12. Silent duel: continuous fire, 142.
13. Target prediction, 143.

10 TACTICAL AIR-WAR GAME, 145

1. Introduction, 145.
2. Formulation of tactical game, 145.
3. Payoff of tactical game, 147.
4. Two tasks—counter air and ground support, 147.
5. Optimal tactics for two tasks, 148.
6. Optimal tactics for three tasks, 151.

11 INFINITE GAMES WITH SEPARABLE PAYOFF FUNCTIONS, 157

1. Introduction, 157.
2. Definition, 157.
3. Moments, 158.
4. Equivalence of $F(x)$ and points of convex set R, 158.
5. Bilinear game over a convex set, 159.
6. Distribution function $F(x)$ and points of convex set R, 160.
7. Number of steps in step-function solution of game, 161.
8. Solution of separable games, 161.
9. Local defense of targets of equal value, 165.
10. Solution of polynomial games, 170.
11. Tactical reconnaissance—single mission, 175.

BIBLIOGRAPHY, 179

INDEX, 181