Name: Central Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy
Author: 25976

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Central Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

Lippi, Francesco

Elgar <editore> 1999

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BIBLIOTECA DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI GIURISPRUDENZA "ENRICO DE NICOLA"

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Inventory 21868

Shelfmark CONS XX.Cm.12

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biblioteche Università Vanvitelli, biblioteche Vanvitelli, biblioteche Università degli Studi della Campania, Sebina, biblioteca, opac, catalogo biblioteca, Campania, Catalogo biblioteca, catalogo on-line, Prestito libri

University Library System of the University of Campania "Luigi Vanvitelli"

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Central Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

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BIBLIOTECA DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI GIURISPRUDENZA "ENRICO DE NICOLA"